

## Message Text

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ORIGIN ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07 IO-10

L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05

BIB-01 DODE-00 /088 R

DRAFTED BY OSD/LBIRD

APPROVED BY ACDA/IR DKLEIN

ACDA/IR:DLINEBAUGH

OSD:LMICHAEL

JCS:WWOOD

C:WSHINN

EUR/RPM:GCHRISTIANSON

PM/DCA:CFLOWEREE

NSC:SHADLEY

S/S - MR. LUERS

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P R 312026Z JAN 75

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INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

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USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T STATE 022964

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS:PARM, NATO

SUBJECT:FRG AND DUTCH QUESTIONS ON AIR MANPOWER IN MBFR

REF: (A) USNATO 151, (B) STATE 2G3866, (C) STATE 8358

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1. MISSION MAY DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING RESPONSES TO THE FRG

QUESTIONS WHICH ARE KEYED TO PARAS REF A, AS WELL AS ON  
REF D AND ON RESPONSE TO UK QUESTIONS (SEPTEL)

A. CONCERNING PART IB (2)

WE WANT TO EMPHASIZE THE FACT THAT OUR FOCUS REMAINS ON EASTERN GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS. OUR PROPOSAL (REF C) WOULD EXPLICITLY RESTRICT THE AMOUNT OF AIR MANPOWER THE EAST COULD REDUCE. IT WOULD NOT DIMINISH AND COULD EVEN INCREASE THE EASTERN GROUND MANPOWER REDUCTION ORIGINALLY PROPOSED. WHILE OUR NEW PROPOSAL IS MORE FORTHCOMING THAN THE CURRENT ALLIED POSITION, IT IS STILL CLEARLY DIFFERENT FROM THE EASTERN "COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH."

B. CONCERNING PART II A

OUR STATEMENT REGARDING THE CONSTRAINT PLACED ON THE WARSAW PACT FORCES BY OUR PROPOSAL IS SIMPLY THAT IT WOULD PLACE SOME LIMIT ON FORCES THAT ARE NOT NOW AS SOPHISTICATED AS NATO FORCES, ARE IMPROVING, AND ARE NOT CONSTRAINED. THE MANPOWER DATA PROVIDED FOR US AIRCRAFT INCLUDES GROUND CREWS. IT IS NOT ANTICIPATED THAT THE WEAPONRY OF THE NEW AIRCRAFT WILL REQUIRE ANY MORE MANPOWER THAN THAT NOW REQUIRED FOR THE SOPHISTICATED ELECTRONICS AND HEAVY LOADINGS OF THE CURRENT AIRCRAFT INVENTORY.

C. CONCERNING PART III C

THE OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY OF TACTICAL FIGHTER AIRCRAFT WILL NOT REPEAT NOT BE REDUCED. THE UNITED STATES MADE THIS STATEMENT AFTER A FULL REVIEW AND WE HAVE SINCE PROVIDED FURTHER ASSURANCES ON THAT SCORE. THE QUESTION OF WARNING TIME HAS BEEN DISCUSSED AT LENGTH IN MC-161, AND THE SGTA STUDY USED SEVERAL DIFFERENT WARNING ASSUMPTIONS. OF COURSE, NO ONE KNOWS HOW MUCH WARNING WOULD BE AVAILABLE, BUT WE CAN BE CONFIDENT THAT SHORTER PACT BUILD-UP ASSUMPTIONS THAN WERE USED IN THE US ANALYSIS (AND THE CONSEQUENTLY SHORTER WARNING TIMES) WOULD DECREASE THE SIZE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ASSUMED PACT THREAT. AS WE HAVE REPLIED TO UK QUESTIONS (SEPTEL) ON CIVILIANIZATION, WE WOULD NOT SEEK A PROVISION THAT WOULD PROHIBIT THE USE OF NON-MILITARY PERSONNEL IN CERTAIN SUPPORT FUNCTIONS. HOST-NATION REQUIREMENTS WOULD NOT

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NECESSARILY BE INCREASED, ALTHOUGH WE DO BELIEVE THAT AN OVERALL REVIEW OF RATIONALIZATION POTENTIAL IS DESIRABLE WITH OR WITHOUT MBFR. THE EFFECTS OF REDUCING SUPPORT FORCES AND THE UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE UNIT WOULD HAVE TO BE DETERMINED BY WEIGHING THEM AGAINST THE DIMINISHED OPPOSING FORCES. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE THEATRE BALANCE WOULD RESULT. QUITE THE CONTRARY, WE BELIEVE THAT THE REDUCTION OF THESE RAPIDLY REINTRO-

DUCABLE USAF FORCES IN RETURN FOR SOVIET FORCES COULD  
IMPROVE THE BALANCE.

2. RE: THE NETHERLANDS QUESTIONS

A. THE US HAS BEGUN A NEW STUDY OF SOVIET AIR MAN-  
POWER MAN-TO-AIRCRAFT RATIOS. RESULTS WILL BE FORWARDED.

B. AIR FORCE EQUIPMENT IS MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO VERI-  
FICATION THAN SOME GROUND EQUIPMENT; THEREFORE, AIR MAN-  
POWER LEVELS CAN BE INFERRED WITH HIGHER CONFIDENCE THAN  
CAN SOME GROUND MANPOWER LEVELS.

C. ALTHOUGH THE MATTER IS STILL UNDER STUDY, ONE  
APPROACH WOULD BE TO SEEK A NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION  
THAT WOULD PROHIBIT "CIVILIANIZATION" OF COMBAT FUNCTIONS  
(RATHER THAN SUPPORT FUNCTIONS), BUT ONE WHICH WOULD NOT  
PROHIBIT NATO FROM FURTHERING ITS CURRENT RELIANCE UPON  
NON-MILITARY PERSONNEL IN CERTAIN SUPPORT ROLES. HERE THE  
DISTINCTION WOULD BE DRAWN BETWEEN A "CIVILIAN" PILOT AND

CIVILIAN COOK OR POSTAL CLERK.

D. THE ABILITY TO EMPLOY AIRCRAFT FROM AREAS  
PERIPHERAL TO THE NGA CURRENTLY FAVORS THE WEST. NATO HAS  
EXTENSIVE AIRCRAFT AND AIRFIELDS ON THE PERIPHERY AND HAS  
SUPERIOR AERIAL REFUELING CAPABILITY, ASSUMING ADEQUATE  
TANKER AVAILABILITY. MOST IMPORTANTLY IN THIS REGARD,  
MOST NATO AIRCRAFT HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY LONGER COMBAT RADIUS  
THAN THE PACT'S. THE MAJORITY OF PACT AIRCRAFT ON THE  
PERIPHERY COULD NOT OPERATE OVER THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN  
BATTLEFRONT WITHOUT FORWARD DEPLOYMENT. BUT MOST NATO  
AIRCRAFT ON THE PERIPHERY DO HAVE SUFFICIENT RANGE TO

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STRIKE ON THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN BATTLEFRONT WITHOUT  
DEPLOYMENT. KISSINGER

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